Category Archives: Theology

Hermeneutical Jujitsu

One of the intriguing aspects of Trayvon Martin’s death is the hermeneutics implicit in Zimmerman’s ‘self-defence’. For those unaware of the story, here is the oversimplified play-by-play: Trayvon Martin, a teenager, was walking from a convenience store through a neighbourhood in the rain wearing a hoodie. Zimmerman, a late-twentysomething civilian neighbourhood watchman, thought Martin was suspicious and phoned the police to report Martin. Zimmerman then, against the recommendations of the police, followed Martin. There was a confrontation which ended with Martin being shot by Zimmerman (who was armed) and Zimmerman having minor injuries. The case was not investigated at the time because Zimmerman claimed self-defence (he said that Martin, a hundred pounds lighter, knocked him to the ground with one punch then began bashing Zimmerman’s head against the pavement).

Florida has a ‘Stand Your Ground’ law which states that people who feel threatened and are not engaged in a criminal activity have the right to use as much force as necessary to protect life and property. This is what Zimmerman used. However, the theological importance here is hermeneutical. Such a law and application of it reflect the general American evangelical ethos of interpretation, namely that of radical subjectivity and situationalism (contrary to their claims to objective and/or absolute truth). Notice that the law is about how one feels — that is, how one interprets one’s situation — and then authorises the person to act as jury (of their interpretation) and executioner (of the offending object). The only objectivity allowed because of this law is how others would act in the same situation, devoid of any relationship to other laws and ethics. In other words, they argue that because representatives of the legal community (police, judges, etc) are unable to see the event unfold firsthand, those legal figures are also unable to reconstruct them accurately. Therefore, it is up to the individual who feels threatened and non-criminal to decide justice.

This is exactly how American evangelicals treat biblical interpretation: since no human living today was there to witness it, there is no way we can reconstruct reliably the biblical narratives and contexts. Therefore, it is up to the individual who feels spiritual to decide its meaning. This is exactly why beliefs such as premillenialism (e.g. Tim LaHaye’s and Jerry Jenkins’s Left Behind series, Hal Lindsey’s Late, Great Planet Earth) persist despite scholarly work which has discounted (if not disproven) such. The proponents of these beliefs are, in effect, standing their ground against the threat of the scholarly community. Which is why the scholarly community as a whole is seen with contempt (e.g., they’re not real Christians) because their work which seeks to construct theology and biblical studies through less subjective (though not necessarily objective) means is seen as a threat to the evangelical belief in sola scriptura – radically interpreted to include individual, divergent interpretations — because it means interpretations can be measured and found wanting (we’ll ignore the fact that evangelicals already practise this, though with the understanding that their interpretation is always already ‘correct’). The real threat, perhaps now obvious, is the loss of individual absolute authority over one’s faith to some kind of communal faith (i.e. tradition).

To return to Trayvon Martin, the issue is the same: do individuals have absolute authority to determine that they are threatened and what amount of force is constituted as necessary? States like Florida have argued that individuals do have this authority* to both determine one’s situation as threatened and that no usage of force is too excessive even if the event can be reconstructed to show that both are demonstrably false. As long as Zimmerman remains free without scrutiny, the state of Florida, and perhaps the federal government, believe that individual absolute authority is more important than any kind of social whole such as the state or country which has been created to protect the life, liberty, and property of those who might otherwise be mistreated because of such individual absolute authority. In other words, ‘Stand Your Ground’ laws make it explicit that it is more important for one to feel threatened than for any threat to be proven. They imply that it is more important for one to react with any force necessary to erase such perceived threats than for authorities to protect people’s lives.  Or, in the frame of the Trayvon Martin case: it is more important for Zimmerman to be proven as the victim of a non-crime who acted in ‘self-defence’ than for the ‘Stand Your Ground’ law to be revealed for what it is: the authorisation of untrained individuals to perform the duties which were previously reserved for personnel trained in law enforcement.

 

*NB: Interestingly, police officers acting both on- and off- duty do not normally have this authority. If they shoot someone who they suspect of criminal activity, they are still investigated by other police officers to see if they used excessive force.

Deleuze Conference Abstract

I forgot to mention this presentation which I’ll be making at the annual International Deleuze Studies Conference in New Orleans this June. Here’s the successful abstract…

‘The Evolution of Theologies, or Opening the Histories of Hermeneutics’

The history of Christian theology is filled with changes, adaptations, and improvisations. To speak of theology as a singular notion imparts a level of orthodoxy which is impossible to maintain as a simple unity within an increasingly fragmentary religious traditions. The question of orthodoxy, then, presupposes a question of authority and answers it in a circular-but-arboreal manner: the orthodoxy — as defined by the authority — defines the authority. By changing even the slightest bit of scriptures, tradition, or institution, the entirety of orthodoxy splits into two parallel structures. Theology — and any kind of thought which establishes an analogue to ‘orthodoxy’ — is a process of mitosis. Unity, such as the appeal to a universal ‘body of Christ’ within Christian ecumenism, is most acutely realized through the very process of separation which creates multiple orthodoxies that are unable to be resolved. In other words, the desire for orthodoxy as an arboreal structure creates within theology a rhizomatic structure that resists the centralization of orthodoxy.

In this paper, I wish to present an argument for heterodoxy as a contingency of authority within theology. Heterodoxy in this case should not be seen as the opposite of orthodoxy but rather as the condition which makes ‘orthodoxy’ possible as an instance of a universal and singular authority. I shall argue that the assertion of orthodoxy is only possible when there is more than one valid claim. My argument will follow a largely Deleuzian approach as one way of interpreting authority through the play of sense. The Reformation era will serve the historical point at which the issue of authority was brought to the forefront of theology, and I shall argue that the most important question of modern ecumenism (still) revolves around this single issue. However, the tendency towards absorbing dissident groups back into one ‘Mother Church’ can only end in failure because heterodoxy — that is, the plurality of orthodoxies — is what makes ecumenical dialogue and reconciliation possible. Rather than suggesting that ecumenism must ultimately accept a single set of positions as properly authoritative from which all deviations move towards heresy, I suggest that there can never be such an orthodoxy for it is based on a gross misperception of the historical development of orthodoxy. To be orthodox, then, is to become something other-than-orthodox because orthodoxy is a semiotic play between theological sense and nonsense.

Joss Whedon and Theology Abstract

Since I received news that my abstract was accepted for the Joss Whedon and Theology book, I thought I’d post my abstract in the hopes that it would generate some helpful comments.

‘Religious Selving in Dollhouse‘

The short-lived television series Dollhouse is about the question of identity — both whether one still possesses one’s original identity after it being removed and also whether one’s identity is singular. I think the second issue is the more interesting one through which to view Dollhouse because it provokes thoughts on the construction of identity. In particular, can one be both religious and non-religious (even ‘secular’)? What is the self if it is a collection of identities? Is it singular? Multiple? These last two questions highlight the struggle to maintain several identities — as all humans do — while still maintain them together as a single self.

I wish to explore the tension between multiple identities as a theological and social issue. By looking at dialogues of religious pluralism, ecumenism, and dual religious practitioners (e.g. Buddhist Christians), I shall argue that identity is always a collection of identities in which many different, and perhaps even competing, ‘selves’ construct an individual. Here is where Dollhouse comes into focus because, as the later part of the series explores, Echo becomes analogous for humanity precisely at the point that she begins to see herself as something other-than-human and as a collection of humans. As Echo tries to find echoes of herself throughout the series, this image can be applied both to individuals as they find echoes of themselves and to universal identities such as religion as practitioners find echoes of their faith everywhere (cf. the various Finding God in… books).

Becoming-person

For the past few weeks, I’ve been thinking about the politicised topic of abortion. More importantly, I was contemplating the idea of the person as a social construct. This is because, as some may already know, my partner is now pregnant and we are awaiting the birth of our first child. What really struck me is that, for the two of us, the embryo (well, foetus now) had already become a person for us. However, I was also thinking about women who choose abortion and I think that, for them, the embryo/foetus is not (and perhaps will never become) a person. If this is accurate, then this is a huge missing piece of the dialogue surrounding abortion. Basically, the general pro-life camp (and perhaps the pro-choice camp as well) focuses on the biological aspects (i.e. conception as the beginning of personhood) at the expense of the social aspects. However, I wish to look at few different areas which, I think, reconstruct the argument in terms which make most of the common arguments moot. These areas each highlight the ambiguities of the debate and show how the pro-life position is, at times, inconsistent and perhaps even harmful to its strictest proponents.

As I mentioned previously, there is a social process in which what a woman carries becomes a human person. It can be agreed upon that the medical/physical occurrence is no earlier than conception (if only because there is no physical thing to become human before conception). One should note, however, that conception does not usually occur immediately after sexual intercourse. Rather, it generally occurs one to six days later. Something like a ‘morning after’ pill works by preventing fertilisation in the first place and implantation in the second is not, in any legal or medical sense of the term, an abortion despite the pro-life camp’s choice word ‘abortifactant’. In fact, the GOP member of Congress and Presidential candidate hopeful Ron Paul has stated such during televised debates for the 2012 election. By painting emergency contraception (how the ‘morning after’ pill is classified) as early abortions, the pro-life camp not only shows that it does not understand the science behind the medicine, but they also contaminate discussions of ‘normal’ contraception (i.e. regular birth control pills and, to a lesser extent, even condoms). This is because the oral contraception pill does the exact same thing as the ‘morning after’ pill — if not more because it does not simply delay ovulation until fertilisation is less likely. The result here is that a truly consistent pro-life advocate must take the Roman Catholic Church’s official stance that all forms of ‘artificial’ birth control must be rejected. I don’t think the majority of evangelicals in the pro-life movement maintain such an extreme position (especially because oral contraception can be and is used for more than just birth control).

The greater issue, then, is when after conception does the fertilised embryo become a human person and at which point in that process is a safe bet that such is the case. The pro-life proponents tend to want to define this as close to conception as possible. Ignoring the ambiguity of defining exactly when conception occurs, there’s a second hypothetical scenario which makes this definition problematic. This is, of course, the case of a miscarriage. They happen on a frequent enough basis that they merit inclusion in this discussion. Why? Medically (and legally) speaking, every miscarriage* is an abortion (well, ‘clinical spontaneous abortion’). Interestingly, though, there is a difference between the embryo and the foetus. This difference is one of age: it is an embryo for the first eight weeks after fertilisation (or gestation up to the 10th week) before it becomes a foetus. During this transition is the first point a heartbeat can be detected and the embryo/foetus first becomes ‘alive’ and perhaps ‘human’ in the broadest sense of the term. Yet, if conception is used as the definition (even if to ‘err on the side of caution’), the legal implication is that every miscarriage can be interpreted as a criminal act (and worse: if it is defined as day one of gestation, than every menstrual cycle which does not result in pregnancy could also be interpreted as criminal acts). This stirs up many issues regarding women’s rights, but I do not have the time to address them at this time (another post in the future, perhaps?).

There is also a theological aspect. For example, Norman Geisler, the stalwart Christian conservative who has written about abortion for years, wrote as late as 1971 (in his Ethics: Alternatives and Issues) that ‘embryo is not fully human — it is an undeveloped person’ and, for that reason, medically induced abortions should be permitted (source). Geisler was not a lone wolf here: both Christianity Today and Eternity magazines had special issues in the early 1970s which included evangelical Christian theologians arguing for abortion because the embryo (and sometimes even the foetus) was not yet a human person. Even as late as 1984, evangelical institutions had not yet solidified their participation in the pro-life movement. For example, Wheaton College’s student government was unable to make a public resolution advocating a strong pro-life perspective because of massive reactions in their own evangelical community (cf. Susan Friend Harding, The Book of Jerry Falwell, p 189ff).

The dominant issue, then, is what I have been implicating throughout this post: at which point does an embryo or foetus become a human person (and, theologically speaking, gain a ‘soul’)? It should be clear that it is some point after conception and before birth. Roe v Wade defines this point at viability (that is, around week 24 of gestation when the foetus becomes capable of surviving outside the womb), but the Partial-Birth Ban Act (passed in 2003) makes intact dilation and extraction, or ‘partial-birth abortion’, illegal even if performed before the 24th week. Legally speaking, this is a decent estimate because it disallows interpreting miscarriages as criminal and it serves as a bookend for the process of becoming-human. That is, after becoming viable, the foetus is definitely human. Yet it could be improved upon. Most abortions occur during the first trimester (roughly 87% according to this chart), so it would seem that pregnant women begin to see the foetus as a human person by the 12th week of gestation. If one incorporates the study in this chart (well, the second chart regarding late abortions), this age could be even earlier.

The more important law to consider, though, is the Unborn Victims of Violence Act (passed on 2004) and the 36 states which have similar laws. Why? The text of the law states that certain actions which cause the death of a foetus (e.g. an abortion) can be tried as a criminal act. This is important because it reinforces the social process of becoming-human. These laws imply that for the women who wish to bring their pregnancy to term as well as those who have not yet made that choice (or, in my language, women who reconstruct the foetus as a human person), their foetus is already a human person despite not being born.

The ambiguities continue to abound; however, this makes it possible to distinguish a few features which the arguments surrounding abortion have lacked. First, the foetus is definitely constructed as a human person by the 24th week of gestation. Secondly, pregnant women (and perhaps their partners) decide — often very quickly and much sooner — whether the embryo/foetus is a human person before then. Thirdly, considering that most women do not discover or confirm they are pregnant until the 4th week of gestation and that most abortions occur before the 12th week, it seems safe to say that by the time the embryo develops into a foetus, it has become a human person. With these in mind, I suggest that the embryo is socially transformed into a human person at the same moment it becomes a foetus in the beginning of the 12th gestational week. That is, unless the pregnant woman (and perhaps her partner) decides sooner (or, in my language, opts out of the social process of becoming-human which began at conception).

Lastly, it seems that the best way to encourage women to reconstruct the embryo/foetus as a human person is through encouraging proper birth control rather than insisting on defining the moment of conception as the legal point at which the embryo/foetus becomes a person. Proper birth control usage and family planning gives women (and their mates) the time and space to (1) settle into a partnership (i.e. ‘marry’ in a broad sense), (2) find when they are ready to have children, and (3) encourage them to treat pregnancy, birth, and life seriously through the process of transforming their future embryos and foetuses into human persons before they are conceived.

 

NB: This is after the fourth week of development. Before then, it is simply an ‘early pregnancy loss’.

Common Sense

Perhaps I’m the only one who thinks this, but we give too much weight to facts. In many conversations — politics, science, religion, you name it — one often suggests that if we could only get down to hashing out the facts, they would speak for themselves and only one interpretation would be possible. I’m not so sure.

When one speaks of these facts, one actually means quantifiable and verifiable observations (how scientific!). While I readily accept that, such sentiment often misses the more important part of the equation: one still reads and interprets those facts, removing them from their original contexts and placing them in a ready-made context which often reinforces one’s own viewpoint. This is why, for example, those who claim that Obama was not a ‘natural-born’ citizen of the United States (and therefore disqualified from being President) continue to insist the truth of their claims despite the evidence provided precisely because they consider that evidence (birth certificate forms) to be fabrications on the basis of his not being born on U.S. soil. While the people who either don’t care or don’t agree with these ‘birthers’ accept the evidence as factual proof that Obama was a ‘natural-born’ citizen, the ‘birthers’ take that evidence as factual proof that he wasn’t.

This kind of logic has developed from two different psychological effects which are based in the Common Sense Realism of the eighteenth century. The first effect is the belief that one will change one’s beliefs when sufficient evidence is presented. The second is the belief that one welcomes divergent views. Both are illusions. Together, these two create the understanding that one has more knowledge of the subject at hand than other dialogue partners and, if only those partners were rational, they would change their minds by the sheer force of evidence presented. The harsher reality is that all the participants in the dialogue are enmeshed in their own reality and refuse to accept evidence contrary to their beliefs as facts. Either the science is biased, the presenter misinterpreted, or the context from which those facts were ripped is inaccurate (or unrealistic!). Whatever the case may be, people (including myself!) do not take new, contrary facts easily (if it is even possible).

The real result of these effects and the presentation of facts is that the very definition of facts is up to interpretation. Take, for example, the general scientific consensus that there is sufficient evidence to support the claim that modern human activity has contributed significantly to global warming. As far as scientific evidence goes, this is confirmed observation, but yet those who disagree speak about believing in climate change. The same also goes with the general scientific consensus on evolution. In other words, even evidence facts must be believed for them to have any degree of truth.

Where this leaves human dialogue, then, is in the realm of debate between orthodoxies. In many (if not all) cases, we have two or more dialogue partners who have their own ready-made realities and every discussion of substance without agreement is a clash of these realities that can never be harmonised. Instead, what normally happens is that the partners end their dialogue (at best, by ‘agreeing to disagree’) with further confirmation of their own set of beliefs as truth and their partners’ set of beliefs as heterodoxy (which is also often equated with heresy).

If this can be overcome, it is through the embrace of pluralism which doesn’t just welcome divergent views but expects them. Such polydoxy can be found in some ecumenical dialogues which find an important point around which agreement can be centered and friendly relationships established. It can also be found in religiously plural environments where people practise multiple faith traditions simultaneously (e.g. Buddhist Christians) as well as in religious groups like the Marranos and Messianic Judaism which also hold two different faiths in tension. In other words, the way out of entrenched orthodoxies is to become, in essence, a Marrano and find a new harmony in the discordance of beliefs.