Archive for the ‘Language & Interpretation’ Series

An investigation of hermeneutics.

Language

This is part 1 of 4 in the Language & Interpretation series

The next thing that needs to be talked about is that of and . It is my contention that all theologies start here, although most do it unknowingly. In my opinion, the best place to start is in the early 20th century with structuralism.

General Linguistics

The fun definitely began around Saussure, a Swiss linguist, who saw language as a definitive structure (hence the name) of “signs” (these consisted of a relationship between “signifier” and “signified”). His classic example is that of a tree:

tree.gif

Saussure’s example has four distinct features:

  1. The image of the tree represents the mental manifestation of the “real” object and is thusly labelled “signified.”
  2. The word “arbor” (French for “tree”) there represents the linguistic phenomenon of the sound-image of the word and is thus called the “signifier.”
  3. The line between the two represents an arbitrary equation between them that includes the transfer of “meaning” from the signified to the signifier.
  4. The circle around this “equation” designates that it is a complete “sign” in which signification occurs.

General Problems

According to this theory, when one is given a particular word-symbol, it is passed through a matrix of these signs until it finds its meaning. Of course, this must happen at very high speed as people do not generally read/listen to one word for more than a split second. For , all of these signs were memorized and were arbitrary. Every single sign must be agreed upon by a community before communication can occur. Of course, this found difficulties later on when the discussion led to how these signs were agreed upon. After all, if there must be an agreed upon system before communication occured, how did any two people communicate with each other to agree upon a system?

As mentioned in #2, language was considered purely in terms of sound patterns. The written words were merely arbitrary representations of the actual language. This will come to haunt the structuralists later on. Furthermore, ideas/concepts (i.e. the signified) could not exist without the language. This also becomes problematic later on.

Lastly, did not accout for metaphorical language and idioms, another problem that surfaces later. This problem may be the “final straw” that ended structuralism, even though its legacy has been far-reaching. Structuralism itself may not have survived, but many of its ideas have survived in various re-formulations.

Post-whatever

This is part 2 of 4 in the Language & Interpretation series

The structuralists (see “Language”) were quickly followed by what became known as the post-structuralists. They saw many of the problems inherent to and sought to find a better way to conceptualize .

Lacan

first saw the problem of seeing language as purely sound waves. His most famous example is that of the restroom door. Suppose a boy and a girl were on a train approaching a train station. When they both see the restroom doors, the boy may say “we’re at the boy’s room.” The girl, finding this wrong, would suggest “no, we are at the girl’s.” The truth is, though, they were at both. The problem is that the two doors (each a signified) were identical except for the placard above them (signifier). Lacan then suggests that the signifier enters in the signified to form the sign. Without that signifier, it would be impossible to determine which door leads to which restroom.

Derrida

Later philosophers would suggest that language is primarily a written form, but they were quickly dismissed upon discovering that many undeveloped cultures do not have a written language. In , we find an idea that language is both written and spoken. His famous example is that of differance. In French, difference and are pronounced exactly the same. Difference is a “real” word that translates as “difference” (amazing!), yet differance is one Derrida coined. As Derrida said, differance “is not: it has neither existence nor essence” (Differance, 111). It comes from primarily two other words defer (meaning “to put off”) and differ (”to be unlike”) while using a gerundive ending to place the word between active and passive voice. The basic reasoning for this term was to suggest that language is in flux as a fluid object. The idea of a clear, stable meaning (which was found in the structuralists) was rejected. The meaning of a word could only be described by using other words. In other words, language is self-referential.

Blanchot

The self-referential idea of language enters into what becomes the postmodern discourse and becomes a key point. Yet, it is Maurice who kills any possible obsession with language. In his The Writing of the Disaster, Blanchot points out that language is unable to do some very important things as it encounters its own walls. Blanchot speaks of the disaster (well, more of dis-aster, coming from the etymology of the word used to imply cataclysmic events such as a star falling) as being the limits of language. Language is unable to fully grasp the dis-aster. Blanchot ultimately concludes that language is highly over-rated.

Meaning

Here is the primary activity of language, yet it is not simply some kind of concrete definition. Some languages make a distinction between the of a word (i.e. how does the dictionary define it?) and the sense of a word (i.e. how is it used in its current context?). By making this distinction, we can account for idiomatic expressions. “Kick the bucket” is no longer bound to one’s foot striking a bucket but can be extended to imply one’s death. This will be important when trying to interpret texts as it requires a context. This sentiment can be found in Derrida’s statement that “there is nothing outside the text.” There is so much relevant to a given text that the interpretation requires but yet this context is so often excluded on the basis of it being irrelevant. When we get to the problem of hermeneutics, we will see that the context of a given text includes all of history coming up to that point and the culture in which it was written. An informed interpretation of the book of Daniel may not be the “common sense” literal reading of it.

Liquidity

This is part 3 of 4 in the Language & Interpretation series

In my previous post in the series, i outlined some strands of the emergence of as it relates to its earliest core: language. Postmodernism is, by and large, a reaction to modernism’s schema of , most notably the that was becoming dominant in the early-to-mid twentieth century. Prior to the “rise” of , there was a major infatuation with language in philosophy. Everyone in that time period was becoming increasingly obsessed with language. Nietzsche, Heidegger, and others while not focusing on language each had their own view of language. Others like Wittgenstein were more focused on the language phenomenon. But, after post-structuralism, language became less of a focus. Of course, there are different trains of thought today when it comes to language, the emphasis has become less and less. The following is primarily my thoughts on language from some kind of postmodern context. It is adapted from a paper i wrote in March on the question of language after postmodernism.

Sense

One of the major strands that arose in the post-structuralist movement was put forth by . He had criticised the concept of “deep structures” where the meaning of a given utterance was below the surface of the actual utterance. His primary suggestion was that meaning was also found at the surface but at the edges of it. Think of it like a plate where the utterances are closer to the center of the plate, but the meaning understood by the recipient is found around the edges and corners. Beyond this, he suggested that there is some kind of “external” reality (although this doesn’t really require any particular kind of epistemological view for it to work) and an “internal” reality. The internal was marked by thought while the external was marked by objects of thought (or even representations of those objects). Communication occurs, for this view, when the two randomly intersect at points Deleuze calls “singularities.” Each singularity is the transmission of thought from one to another. Here, though the meaning of a given phrase is in some kind of contextual flux where the given utterance is understood within the given context and isn’t necessarily understood that way in a different context.

Understanding

Derrida picked up on some parts of Deleuze when he said that “there is nothing outside the text.” For , the meaning of an utterance is only as good as the known context…and everything is context. This is where i will pick up. Deleuze’s “external” reality is more like a formless liquid. The meaning of a given utterance is arbitrary in that something like the word “red” refers to what is considered “red” because it has been imposed upon the “external.” There is nothing inherent to a cherry or an apple that makes it necessarily “red.” That color can just as easily be “grurpue” and those objects would be that. Therefore, i suggest that language is much like a glass which is used to constrain the “external” reality. Language is limited by itself and is self-referential. The “external” reality that remains apart from the glass of language is beyond a given language community’s understanding. Things like death and infinity are beyond most, if not all languages, but that is because the cup of language hasn’t been able to contain those “external” concepts. Communication is only possible when the communicants have some understanding of each other’s cup of language. It is generally assumed that those who use similar utterances are using similar cups, but that is just an assumption. There is nothing inherent in any of my writing here that guarantees i am using English. That is something assumed by you (my reader). In a more functional view, this assumption is worthwhile because otherwise nobody would be certain of their communications.

Sensing Meaning

This leads us to a kind of disjunct where the theoretical differs from the functional. It would be better to continue using the functional for the reason that it is functional. The theoretical is good for conversation pieces, but not for any kind of functional working. Yet, this leads us to the matter of interpretation. Not only should one be concerned with how one interprets another’s communication directed at the one (e.g. how do you interpret these symbols and the meaning contained within their patterns) but also how does one interpret something written by another to another (e.g. how do you interpret something like the Bible which was written by somebody to somebody else…and neither of those people are you). In the next part, i will explain this further and how we should approach interpreting communications that are completely external to somebody. It may well be impossible to place oneself within a totally foreign context, meaning that we may never be certain of the . But, there may be some functional method with which we can have some kind of working understanding that will remain fluid so that if more context becomes available, the interpretation can change.

Ancient Future Interpretation

This is part 4 of 4 in the Language & Interpretation series

The last part of this series turns us from what is to how do we use it, particularly in a “” context. Previously, i outlined the liquidity of language and its meaning. In the religious context, how should people interpret their “Scriptures” whether that be the Qur’an, the Bible, or the Upanishads. My answer would be “historically.”

Ancient

The first thing we should do when interpreting a book (or even a conversation) is that we should place it in its context. For instance, in the Book of Mark, how should Jesus’ reference to the “” be seen? Geza Vermes, in his book Jesus the Jew, suggests that “son of man” was an Aramaic idiom simply referring to the person speaking (and also sometimes the person spoken to). In his view, this phrase has no connection whatsoever with Daniel 7, 1 Enoch, or 2 Esdras (the only three locations in what can be called “Scripture” in Jesus’ time where the phrase is used). This view is further supported by going to the claims in 1 Enoch and 2 Esdras. In 1 Enoch, the “son of man” is directly referred to as Enoch himself. To use it as support for some eschatological figure would quickly remove Jesus from the possibility of being that figure. In 2 Esdras, the references to the “son of man” shed no new light on this figure. Furthermore, 2 Esdras is believed to have been written after Jesus was resurrected, thus making it an unlikely source for confirmation. We are left with Daniel 7. Looking at the rabbinic teachings of the era (i.e. the Talmud and the Mishnah), it is seen that none of the rabbis prior to the late 1st century saw the “son of man” in Daniel 7 as some kind of prophecy, let alone one about the . It is not until the 1st century (which is when Mark is written) that we see a shift in understanding. First Christians and then Jews began to re-interpret Daniel 7 as a prophecy of the Messiah.

Textually, scholars have suggested that, of the 70+ references to the “son of man” in the 4 gospels, only 5 bear any kind of relation to Daniel 7…and none of those were spoken by . Therefore, it would appear that at the earliest context, “son of man” was not a reference to the Messiah and only became such after Christianity. As such, i suggest that we should not take statements of Jesus in the Gospel as allusions to a greater figure.

Traditional

In the Christian tradition, the idiomatic interpretation of “son of man” has disappeared. Most would see “son of man” as a direct reference to Daniel 7 and the eschatological figure. As such, we should take this when reading it after the gospels, as it is what most Christians believed.

Futural

While this view of interpretation seems rather oddly named because it focuses on both the historical application and contextual usage, it also becomes futural in that it changes. Interpretations change to fit the language and culture of the day, but the message itself does not. With an understanding of the development of ideas, it is easy to see how some views that are proclaimed as historically accurate but have little historical basis (e.g. premillenialism, but that’s another topic!). Furthermore, it is a way to retain historical orthodoxy without excluding the contemporary culture.