Tag Archive for 'Postmodernism'

The War-Machine

Published
by
christopher
3 November 2006 ago
in Postmodernism
. 4 Comments

There is something that is absolute difference.  Deleuze sees it in what he calls the War-Machine.  It is without respect or reason, without emotion or attachment.  It borders on the suicidal and self-defeating.  It is always and absolutely conflictive difference.  It does not accept “community” or the contemporary notion of “diversity.”  It rejects the Hegelian subsumption of difference under identity.  It does not believe in “unity in diversity.”  It engenders hate.  It follows no rules, no laws, no structures.  It does not act for some “good.”  It does not even act for some “evil.”  It simply acts.

Deleuze believes that the best example of the War-Machine is Genghis Khan and his Mongolian warriors.  Even though they conquered the Chinese empire and large portions of the Muslim one, they slept in tents.  They razed cities, drove around the Great Wall, and killed for kicks.  Yet they never built (or rebuilt) cities, did not institute a new government, nor even made it mandatory for the people they destroyed to adhere to their laws.  This is because they had none.  There was no hierarchy.  They were rhizomatic….like weeds.  Yet, because of their lack of respect for laws, rules, and structures, they were also suicidal.  At any moment, they could have brought about their own destruction.  Yet they would still act without remorse.

Another example is that of Geronimo.  Here was a man upset at the Spanish.  Along with just two troops, he snuck past the guards and into the center of the Spanish encampment…and opened fire.  They were able to shoot 20 people dead.  It was a massacre by three.  That is the intensity of the War-Machine.

Today, there are many groups surfacing in this mode.  I say “mode” because it is not something one can always avoid.  Currently, the Christian Right, as well as other groups of neofundamentalists (e.g. the al Qaeda brand), are becoming machinic.  They are moving towards that suicidal grasp.  The recent problem with Ted Haggard is one such example.  One cannot become the War-Machine without losing control, ethics, and morality.  The War-Machine is pre-philosophic, pre-ethical, pre-morality.  It is passion and intensity.  It deterritorializes its past (i.e. removes the context of its past in which it is situated) and creates a new context which disregards both its contemporary locality and its historical context.  As Nietzsche said (On the Genealogy of Morals, of which Deleuze quotes often), “They come like fate, without resaon, consideration, or pretext…”  The War-Machine becomes the face of the other: a blank wall with two dark eyes.  It is the completely unknown.

De-scribing Theology

Published
by
christopher
16 October 2006 ago
in Postmodernism and Theology
. 0 Comments

i have posted my “paper” on Rollins’s book at Church and Postmodern Culture.
It can be downloaded here.

Liquidity

Published
by
christopher
10 May 2006 ago
in Philosophy and Postmodernism
. 3 Comments
Language & Interpretation
1: Language 2: Post-whatever 3: Liquidity 4: Ancient Future Interpretation

In my previous post in the series, i outlined some strands of the emergence of as it relates to its earliest core: language. Postmodernism is, by and large, a reaction to modernism’s schema of , most notably the that was becoming dominant in the early-to-mid twentieth century. Prior to the “rise” of , there was a major infatuation with language in philosophy. Everyone in that time period was becoming increasingly obsessed with language. Nietzsche, Heidegger, and others while not focusing on language each had their own view of language. Others like Wittgenstein were more focused on the language phenomenon. But, after post-structuralism, language became less of a focus. Of course, there are different trains of thought today when it comes to language, the emphasis has become less and less. The following is primarily my thoughts on language from some kind of postmodern context. It is adapted from a paper i wrote in March on the question of language after postmodernism.

Sense

One of the major strands that arose in the post-structuralist movement was put forth by . He had criticised the concept of “deep structures” where the meaning of a given utterance was below the surface of the actual utterance. His primary suggestion was that meaning was also found at the surface but at the edges of it. Think of it like a plate where the utterances are closer to the center of the plate, but the meaning understood by the recipient is found around the edges and corners. Beyond this, he suggested that there is some kind of “external” reality (although this doesn’t really require any particular kind of epistemological view for it to work) and an “internal” reality. The internal was marked by thought while the external was marked by objects of thought (or even representations of those objects). Communication occurs, for this view, when the two randomly intersect at points Deleuze calls “singularities.” Each singularity is the transmission of thought from one to another. Here, though the meaning of a given phrase is in some kind of contextual flux where the given utterance is understood within the given context and isn’t necessarily understood that way in a different context.

Understanding

Derrida picked up on some parts of Deleuze when he said that “there is nothing outside the text.” For , the meaning of an utterance is only as good as the known context…and everything is context. This is where i will pick up. Deleuze’s “external” reality is more like a formless liquid. The meaning of a given utterance is arbitrary in that something like the word “red” refers to what is considered “red” because it has been imposed upon the “external.” There is nothing inherent to a cherry or an apple that makes it necessarily “red.” That color can just as easily be “grurpue” and those objects would be that. Therefore, i suggest that language is much like a glass which is used to constrain the “external” reality. Language is limited by itself and is self-referential. The “external” reality that remains apart from the glass of language is beyond a given language community’s understanding. Things like death and infinity are beyond most, if not all languages, but that is because the cup of language hasn’t been able to contain those “external” concepts. Communication is only possible when the communicants have some understanding of each other’s cup of language. It is generally assumed that those who use similar utterances are using similar cups, but that is just an assumption. There is nothing inherent in any of my writing here that guarantees i am using English. That is something assumed by you (my reader). In a more functional view, this assumption is worthwhile because otherwise nobody would be certain of their communications.

Sensing Meaning

This leads us to a kind of disjunct where the theoretical differs from the functional. It would be better to continue using the functional for the reason that it is functional. The theoretical is good for conversation pieces, but not for any kind of functional working. Yet, this leads us to the matter of interpretation. Not only should one be concerned with how one interprets another’s communication directed at the one (e.g. how do you interpret these symbols and the meaning contained within their patterns) but also how does one interpret something written by another to another (e.g. how do you interpret something like the Bible which was written by somebody to somebody else…and neither of those people are you). In the next part, i will explain this further and how we should approach interpreting communications that are completely external to somebody. It may well be impossible to place oneself within a totally foreign context, meaning that we may never be certain of the . But, there may be some functional method with which we can have some kind of working understanding that will remain fluid so that if more context becomes available, the interpretation can change.

Criticism and Belief

Published
by
christopher
18 April 2006 ago
in Postmodernism and Theology
. 0 Comments

What i find amazingly funny is websites like these:

i don’t really like criticising others because there is enough of that going around, so i will not criticise the people who wrote these, nor make any claims regarding their spirituality. But, i will point out a few features:

  1. When speaking of the “good side” (i.e. the “Biblical” side), we should rip verses and passages from the Bible to prove our point.
  2. When speaking of the “bad side” (i.e. the “postmodern” side), we should not quote anyone whatsoever and make strong assertions about how screwed up it is compared to what “we” believe.

i’m sorry, but the minute one decides that he is right and makes everyone else wrong, we have moved beyond any kind of meaningful discourse. It becomes “us” versus “them” where “us” is right and “them” is wrong. Self-righteousness like that shouldn’t be accepted as a “Christian” attitude. We are called to be humble in all things, including knowledge. By denying the possibility of being wrong, we become prideful and immediately exclude ourselves from the grace God gives.
So, what’s my point? Should we critique others? Sure, but we should stick to the principle of falsifiability: the possibility that we’re wrong. If one doesn’t want to be wrong on some things (such as the Resurrection of Christ or the existence of God), then assume it true but always with the disclaimer that it is assumed true and not proven true. Too many today think that assuming something as true is wrong. That is a wrong assumption to have. And yes, that pun is intended.

Technorati Tags: , , ,

Zizek on love

Published
by
christopher
7 April 2006 ago
in Postmodernism
. 0 Comments

Here are some words from Zizek himself on love:

More generally, when one is passionately in love and, after not seeing the beloved for a long time, asks her for a photo to keep in mind her features, the true aim of this request is not to check if the properties of the beloved still fits the criteria of my live, but, on the contrary, to learn (again) what these criteria are. I am in love absolutely, and the photo a priori CANNOT be a disappointment - I need it just so that it will tell me WHAT I love… What this means is that true love is performative in the sense that it CHANGES its object - not in the sense of idealization, but in the sense of opening up a gap in it, a gap between the object’s positive properties and the agalma, the mysterious core of the beloved (which is why I do not love you because of your properties which are worthy of love: on the contrary, it is only because of my love for you that your features appear to me as worthy of love). It is for this reason that finding oneself in the position of the beloved is so violent, traumatic even: being loved makes me feel directly the gap between what I am as a determinate being and the unfathomable X in me which causes love. Everyone knows Lacan’s definition of love (”Love is giving something one doesn’t have…”); what one often forgets is to add the other half which completes the sentence: “… to someone who doesn’t want it.” And is this not confirmed by our most elementary experience when somebody unexpectedly declared passionate love to us - is not the first reaction, preceding the possible positive reply, that something obscene, intrusive, is being forced upon us?

From “With or Without Passion”: link

Analyzing “Emergent”

Published
by
christopher
6 April 2006 ago
in Postmodernism and Theology
. 7 Comments
What is “Emergent”
Intro: “Emergent” 1: “Emergent” and Culture 2: Targets of “Emergent” 3: “Emergent” Epistemology 4: “Emergent” Superior? 5: Analyzing “Emergent”

Scot’s last question:

#5: Has the movement understood culture accurately? Does it appeal to Scripture accurately?

Given the previous posts, the first quesion is simple to answer: yes. “Emergent” has arisen as a means to reach today’s culture. It even draws from the .
The second question, though, requires more. Too many movements in history claimed to interpret and appeal to Scripture correctly. We first need to understand what the “Emergent church” sees as good hermeneutics. It appears that most in the movement want the interpretation of Scripture to be fluid. That is, instead of defining a rigid and exhaustive system defined as “orthodoxy,” many in “Emergent” want to define some borders which one cannot cross and remain “orthodox” but allows room for some variations on interpretation. In some ways, this is a move from trying to “be right” to “not being wrong.” Many groups of Christians have equated the two, but “Emergent” appears to dissociate the two and even allow some generosity and humility in the interpretation game.
So, does “Emergent” appeal to Scripture accurately? It depends. If one maintains a very strict interpretation of Scripture, then nobody besides that one is accurate. But, in today’s society, strict interpretation has become a rather quaint peculiarity of true fundamentalists. “Emergent” has been pretty vocal in not becoming such. And so have i. So, for me, “Emergent” has generally appealed to Scripture in acceptable ways. Accuracy still implies a single correct answer; and that is something postmodernism rejects as a human possibility. It may very well be true that there is only one answer, but we humans are incapable of reaching it…and we haven’t been promised it.

Postmodernism and Megachurch

Published
by
christopher
5 April 2006 ago
in Postmodernism and Theology
. 2 Comments

It seems that many critics of the emerging church like to equate it with the movement.  This is problematic because it is a misinterpretation of both movements.  First off, the megachurch movement was around well before “emerging” was even a word.  Secondly, the megachurch movement is (predominantly) an American Protestant movement, just like fundamentalism was.  It really began after 1955 and is found more in the South than any other area (link 1, link 2).  In comparison, Derrida (perhaps the most famous name when discussing postmodernism in America) was not even known to American universities until the early 1980s.

The main characteristics of megachurches are: (1) denominational (2/3rd have some denominational association, but this may be in name only), (2) multiple services per weekend (only 18% have less than 3 services per weekend), (3) politically conservative (over 80% of members describe themselves as being either conservative [50%] or somewhat conservative [33%]) and not politically involved (only 16% of the churches claimed to have partnered with another church in a political activity), (4) multi-ethnic (36% of churches claimed to have at least a 20% presence of minorities), (5) individual emphasis (over 75% of the members say that their church emphasises personal scripture study, personal devotions, and personal financial giving, while only 53% said there was an emphasis on family devotions), (6) emphasis on “belief” (over 70%  said that the key church activities centered on study/discussion groups and education/”Sunday school” classes, whereas less than 40% said the same about fundraising activities and social service activities), (7) membership is young married college graduates with children, and (8) emphasis on “evangelism” (members report large percentages of being encouraged to invite others to services and tell nonmembers about their own faith, churches sponsor a program or event to attract new visitors.  Communication (through distributed flyers/newsletters, radio/TV advertisements, and follow-up contact with first-time visitors each scored over 75%).  All data can be found at the above-mentioned link 2.
While the “emerging church” movement shares some of these features, these features are the ones that are also expected to be found in any “healthy” church.  Furthermore, using these features, it would appear that “emergent church” critics have more in common with megachurches than the “emergent” ones: denominational, politically conservative, emphasis on “belief”, and “emphasis” on evangelism.
The “emergent church” movement, on the other hand, does not default as politically conservative, is politically active, attempts to be multi-ethnic, is not denominational (or at least is denominational in name only), and does not have an individual emphasis.  It may be true that the “emergent church” arose out of the megachurch movement in some kind of response to it, but to suggest that response was positive is a mistreating of the evidence available.

“Emergent” Superior?

Published
by
christopher
4 April 2006 ago
in Postmodernism and Theology
. 3 Comments
What is “Emergent”
Intro: “Emergent” 1: “Emergent” and Culture 2: Targets of “Emergent” 3: “Emergent” Epistemology 4: “Emergent” Superior? 5: Analyzing “Emergent”

After the previous post, i hope that the answer to Scot’s next question is fairly obvious. Scot asks:

#4: Is “emergent” or “integral” thinking superior to traditional absolutist rational thinking?

i think the short answer is no. Last time, i outlined what i believed to be the origins of “” epistemology. As coming from “traditional absolutist rational thinking” and being in between that and its polar opposite of “relativist thinking,” i don’t find labeling it “superior” or “inferior” is of any use. It is simply a different approach which appears to be in greater use currently. Each approach has positive and negative side effects, and, with the current state of affairs in culture, philosophy, and theology, the “emergent” thinking is more popular. There will come a time when it is replaced by another approach and those people who contemplate it long and hard will ask the same question. Hopefully, they will also answer that theirs is not the “ultimate” or the “final” answer.

“Emergent” epistemology

Published
by
christopher
3 April 2006 ago
in Philosophy, Postmodernism and Theology
. 6 Comments
What is “Emergent”
Intro: “Emergent” 1: “Emergent” and Culture 2: Targets of “Emergent” 3: “Emergent” Epistemology 4: “Emergent” Superior? 5: Analyzing “Emergent”

Back to Scot’s questions:

#3: Is the postmodernist of the Emerging folks (and one should not simply equate postmodernists and the Emergent folks) essentially affectional over against rational? inclusive vs. exclusivist? authentic vs. the absolute? is social history more significant that the history of ideas?

This may be one of the biggest parts in the emerging church movement. Scot deals with it in multiple posts, namely: truth and epistemology. To see where “Emergent” epistemology comes from, we must first go back to the primart start of the question. That, for the most part, is Modernism through (German) Idealism. Early modern philosophy (that is, Western philosophy since Descartes) has worked from the positions of and correspondence. Later modern philosophy (particularly that of Idealism, especially German) took an opposite stance of subjectivism and coherentism. Postmodern philosophy has generally disregarded these two as being exclusive theories.

Truth

For Modernism, the theory of truth was that of correspondence. In geek terms, this is represented by WYSIWYG: What You See Is What You Get. Perception and reality corresponds to each other. A statement something is true if and only if it corresponds to the way things are in the “real world.” So, the statement “the book is white” is true if and only if it is in reference to a white book. If i was pointing to a green book when i made that statement, the statement would be false. This theory is good because it seems to work very well because (as said earlier) WYSIWYG. But, this theory has two problems:

  1. We cannot step “outside” of our perceptions to see if it is true. At best, we can reach a universal agreement.
  2. We must assume a set of arbitrary labels before analyzing the statement. We must already be in agreement what “book” means and what “white” means. Furthermore, we are assuming that this agreement is universal or else someone (such as a colorblind person) may agree that “the book is white” when i point to a “green book.”

The second major theory of truth developed well after correspondence. The theory of coherence defines a statement something as true if and only if it is consistent with an already assumed set of statements. “Santa Claus exists” is false because its falsity fits better with the laws of physics (link) than if it were true.
It is most likely that we construct truth through a combination of these two (and possibly more) theories of truth. Taking one to be absolutely true to the exclusion of the other would lead to an indefensible extreme (absolutism on one hand and relativism on the other). Postmodernism has chosen to navigate as such. “Emergent” also takes this path by rejecting both extremes.

Knowledge

Closely related to truth is the theory of knowledge. Again, there are two major theories of knowledge that are used in modernism: foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalism was popular in early modern philosophy and can be likened to a pyramid. Basic beliefs create the foundation from which other beliefs are derived. If a basic belief is changed, so must everything derived from it. Generally, this theory requires that the object of knowledge be true (see above), the subject must believe it, and the subject must be justified somehow in believing it. The knowing cannot be accidental or coincidental. For instance, if there was a clock in a room stopped at 11:25 AM and i happened upon it at that time, my knowledge that it is 11:25 AM is coincidental. The clock, because it has stopped, is not a reliable source of truth. The fact that it was 11:25 AM was simply coincidental. If it had happened to be 3:12 PM, then my knowledge based on the stopped clock that it was 11:25 AM would have been wrong. So knowledge must be justified through some reliable evidence.
Gettier, though, brings up a number of counterexamples that discount this theory. One is that of Mr. Smith. In short, Smith’s daughter tells him that she has just bought a car. She is honest, reliable, and Smith knows of no reason she would deceive him. Therefore, Smith now believes that “his daughter just bought a car”. Furthermore, because of this, Smith also believes that “someone in his family just bought a car.” Unbeknownst to Smith, his duaghter is lying to distract him from the fact that Smith’s wife just bought a car as a surprise for Smith on his birthday tomorrow. Smith believes “someone in his family just bought a car.” Furthermore, it is true. Even further, Smith is justified in believing it (as his reliable and honest daughter gave him the information). But, we don’t wan’t to call this knowledge because Smith’s knowledge is for a wrong reason. His “knowledge” is accidental.
The second theory of knowledge can be likened to a crossword puzzle or a raft. The whole is greater than the parts. Something is true only in its coherence with others. Yet, there is not a foundational knowledge from which others are derived. Beliefs here have an interlocking strength even if, taken individually, they are open to doubt.
Postmodernism uses both of these theories for knowledge. By combining these two, postmodern philosophy can account for “the book is white” by analizing both the propositional statement and the non-propositional information. “Book” and “white” are accounted for in postmodernism so that the statement “the book is white” is true only when in specific contexts that willingly agree upon given labels (such as “white” and “book”). The statement is not true because there happens to be a white book being referenced. “Emergent” epistemology comes from this view.

“Emergent” epistemology

Scot asked how we should see “Emergent” epistemology. In many ways, it seeks to be in between the poles that Scot offered. It seeks to navigate between absolute and relative. It seeks to be inclusive of other possibilities by attempting to remain humble about the humanness behind human knowing.

Parole

Published
by
christopher
22 March 2006 ago
in Philosophy and Postmodernism
. 0 Comments

i’ve decided that any discussion that relies on (including this one) is nothing more than acceptable sophistry. It’s all word play and nothing more. Sure, we attempt to transmit some idea, but language is so horribly liquid, that any reception of similar meaning is nothing more than coincidence.

Furthermore, i think Plato’s biggest point about the ideal is that is does not include any “philosopher” or anyone who thinks too much. Socrates was taken out and killed by the people. is word play that attempts to make one doubt whatever one believes.