Tag Archives: Postmodernism

The War-Machine

There is something that is absolute difference.  Deleuze sees it in what he calls the War-Machine.  It is without respect or reason, without emotion or attachment.  It borders on the suicidal and self-defeating.  It is always and absolutely conflictive difference.  It does not accept “community” or the contemporary notion of “diversity.”  It rejects the Hegelian subsumption of difference under identity.  It does not believe in “unity in diversity.”  It engenders hate.  It follows no rules, no laws, no structures.  It does not act for some “good.”  It does not even act for some “evil.”  It simply acts.

Deleuze believes that the best example of the War-Machine is Genghis Khan and his Mongolian warriors.  Even though they conquered the Chinese empire and large portions of the Muslim one, they slept in tents.  They razed cities, drove around the Great Wall, and killed for kicks.  Yet they never built (or rebuilt) cities, did not institute a new government, nor even made it mandatory for the people they destroyed to adhere to their laws.  This is because they had none.  There was no hierarchy.  They were rhizomatic….like weeds.  Yet, because of their lack of respect for laws, rules, and structures, they were also suicidal.  At any moment, they could have brought about their own destruction.  Yet they would still act without remorse.

Another example is that of Geronimo.  Here was a man upset at the Spanish.  Along with just two troops, he snuck past the guards and into the center of the Spanish encampment…and opened fire.  They were able to shoot 20 people dead.  It was a massacre by three.  That is the intensity of the War-Machine.

Today, there are many groups surfacing in this mode.  I say “mode” because it is not something one can always avoid.  Currently, the Christian Right, as well as other groups of neofundamentalists (e.g. the al Qaeda brand), are becoming machinic.  They are moving towards that suicidal grasp.  The recent problem with Ted Haggard is one such example.  One cannot become the War-Machine without losing control, ethics, and morality.  The War-Machine is pre-philosophic, pre-ethical, pre-morality.  It is passion and intensity.  It deterritorializes its past (i.e. removes the context of its past in which it is situated) and creates a new context which disregards both its contemporary locality and its historical context.  As Nietzsche said (On the Genealogy of Morals, of which Deleuze quotes often), “They come like fate, without resaon, consideration, or pretext…”  The War-Machine becomes the face of the other: a blank wall with two dark eyes.  It is the completely unknown.

Liquidity

This is part 3 of 4 in the Language & Interpretation series

In my previous post in the series, i outlined some strands of the emergence of as it relates to its earliest core: language. Postmodernism is, by and large, a reaction to modernism’s schema of , most notably the that was becoming dominant in the early-to-mid twentieth century. Prior to the “rise” of , there was a major infatuation with language in philosophy. Everyone in that time period was becoming increasingly obsessed with language. Nietzsche, Heidegger, and others while not focusing on language each had their own view of language. Others like Wittgenstein were more focused on the language phenomenon. But, after post-structuralism, language became less of a focus. Of course, there are different trains of thought today when it comes to language, the emphasis has become less and less. The following is primarily my thoughts on language from some kind of postmodern context. It is adapted from a paper i wrote in March on the question of language after postmodernism.

Sense

One of the major strands that arose in the post-structuralist movement was put forth by . He had criticised the concept of “deep structures” where the meaning of a given utterance was below the surface of the actual utterance. His primary suggestion was that meaning was also found at the surface but at the edges of it. Think of it like a plate where the utterances are closer to the center of the plate, but the meaning understood by the recipient is found around the edges and corners. Beyond this, he suggested that there is some kind of “external” reality (although this doesn’t really require any particular kind of epistemological view for it to work) and an “internal” reality. The internal was marked by thought while the external was marked by objects of thought (or even representations of those objects). Communication occurs, for this view, when the two randomly intersect at points Deleuze calls “singularities.” Each singularity is the transmission of thought from one to another. Here, though the meaning of a given phrase is in some kind of contextual flux where the given utterance is understood within the given context and isn’t necessarily understood that way in a different context.

Understanding

Derrida picked up on some parts of Deleuze when he said that “there is nothing outside the text.” For , the meaning of an utterance is only as good as the known context…and everything is context. This is where i will pick up. Deleuze’s “external” reality is more like a formless liquid. The meaning of a given utterance is arbitrary in that something like the word “red” refers to what is considered “red” because it has been imposed upon the “external.” There is nothing inherent to a cherry or an apple that makes it necessarily “red.” That color can just as easily be “grurpue” and those objects would be that. Therefore, i suggest that language is much like a glass which is used to constrain the “external” reality. Language is limited by itself and is self-referential. The “external” reality that remains apart from the glass of language is beyond a given language community’s understanding. Things like death and infinity are beyond most, if not all languages, but that is because the cup of language hasn’t been able to contain those “external” concepts. Communication is only possible when the communicants have some understanding of each other’s cup of language. It is generally assumed that those who use similar utterances are using similar cups, but that is just an assumption. There is nothing inherent in any of my writing here that guarantees i am using English. That is something assumed by you (my reader). In a more functional view, this assumption is worthwhile because otherwise nobody would be certain of their communications.

Sensing Meaning

This leads us to a kind of disjunct where the theoretical differs from the functional. It would be better to continue using the functional for the reason that it is functional. The theoretical is good for conversation pieces, but not for any kind of functional working. Yet, this leads us to the matter of interpretation. Not only should one be concerned with how one interprets another’s communication directed at the one (e.g. how do you interpret these symbols and the meaning contained within their patterns) but also how does one interpret something written by another to another (e.g. how do you interpret something like the Bible which was written by somebody to somebody else…and neither of those people are you). In the next part, i will explain this further and how we should approach interpreting communications that are completely external to somebody. It may well be impossible to place oneself within a totally foreign context, meaning that we may never be certain of the . But, there may be some functional method with which we can have some kind of working understanding that will remain fluid so that if more context becomes available, the interpretation can change.

Criticism and Belief

What i find amazingly funny is websites like these:

i don’t really like criticising others because there is enough of that going around, so i will not criticise the people who wrote these, nor make any claims regarding their spirituality. But, i will point out a few features:

  1. When speaking of the “good side” (i.e. the “Biblical” side), we should rip verses and passages from the Bible to prove our point.
  2. When speaking of the “bad side” (i.e. the “postmodern” side), we should not quote anyone whatsoever and make strong assertions about how screwed up it is compared to what “we” believe.

i’m sorry, but the minute one decides that he is right and makes everyone else wrong, we have moved beyond any kind of meaningful discourse. It becomes “us” versus “them” where “us” is right and “them” is wrong. Self-righteousness like that shouldn’t be accepted as a “Christian” attitude. We are called to be humble in all things, including knowledge. By denying the possibility of being wrong, we become prideful and immediately exclude ourselves from the grace God gives.
So, what’s my point? Should we critique others? Sure, but we should stick to the principle of falsifiability: the possibility that we’re wrong. If one doesn’t want to be wrong on some things (such as the Resurrection of Christ or the existence of God), then assume it true but always with the disclaimer that it is assumed true and not proven true. Too many today think that assuming something as true is wrong. That is a wrong assumption to have. And yes, that pun is intended.

Technorati Tags: , , ,

Zizek on love

Here are some words from Zizek himself on love:

More generally, when one is passionately in love and, after not seeing the beloved for a long time, asks her for a photo to keep in mind her features, the true aim of this request is not to check if the properties of the beloved still fits the criteria of my live, but, on the contrary, to learn (again) what these criteria are. I am in love absolutely, and the photo a priori CANNOT be a disappointment – I need it just so that it will tell me WHAT I love… What this means is that true love is performative in the sense that it CHANGES its object – not in the sense of idealization, but in the sense of opening up a gap in it, a gap between the object’s positive properties and the agalma, the mysterious core of the beloved (which is why I do not love you because of your properties which are worthy of love: on the contrary, it is only because of my love for you that your features appear to me as worthy of love). It is for this reason that finding oneself in the position of the beloved is so violent, traumatic even: being loved makes me feel directly the gap between what I am as a determinate being and the unfathomable X in me which causes love. Everyone knows Lacan’s definition of love (“Love is giving something one doesn’t have…”); what one often forgets is to add the other half which completes the sentence: “… to someone who doesn’t want it.” And is this not confirmed by our most elementary experience when somebody unexpectedly declared passionate love to us – is not the first reaction, preceding the possible positive reply, that something obscene, intrusive, is being forced upon us?

From “With or Without Passion”: link