Tag Archive for 'sense'

Paradoxa

Published on 8 October 2009 ago in Philosophy and Theology. Closed Tags: , , , , , , , , , .

Hopefully, this is not against my better judgment, but I want to throw a little piece of something I’m working out at the moment.

Deleuze’s theory of meaning and sense is best described as ‘a series of paradoxes’, partly because ’sense is a nonexisting entity, and, in fact, maintains very special relations with nonsense’ (Logic of Sense, xiii). Paradoxes are produced from the relationship between sense and nonsense; it is the very excess of that relationship. I suggest that this can also be interpreted through Tillich’s definition of paradox as the ‘logical form in which the perfectly concrete and the perfectly absolute are united’ (Systematic Theology 1, 167). While the word choice is different, the content is strikingly similar. Tillich’s ‘perfectly concrete’ speaks of a particular instance within the finite–in other words an understandable revelation. This is very much in agreement with Deleuze’s usage of ’sense’. For both, this is not a final entity but a result, dependent upon the subject’s own context. The difficulty in equating Tillich’s and Deleuze’s definitions of ‘paradox’ comes with the second part of the ‘perfectly absolute’ and nonsense, respectively. For Deleuze, nonsense is can be compared to Tillich’s ‘perfectly absolute’ only as the infinite abyss beneath the surface. For Tillich, this abyss is the nonexisting God, the ground of Being.(ST1, 264) For Deleuze, however, this abyss is an empty signifier, a position without meaning; and this non-thing bears no relation to Being. With these differences aside, paradoxes are produced from the relationship between ’sense’ and something else (the absolute or ‘nonsense’). Deleuze paints the two (sense and nonsense, that is) using the image of a Möbius strip; the two form the two halves of the the hermeneutical cycle that plays in the figuring of sense; it is the ‘coexistence of two sides without thickness’ as a flat, endless plane of meaning(LS, 22). For Deleuze, a symbol’s meaning is an infinite regress of signification where a symbol always and only points to other symbols. He has reduced this regress to a process of four steps which repeat infinitely:

There is [1] the name of what the song really is; [2] the name denoting this reality, which thus denotes the song or represents what the song is called; [3] the sense of this name, which forms a new name or a new reality; and [4] the name which denotes this reality, which this denotes the sense of the name of the song, or represents what the name of the song is called. (LS, 30)

The meaning of this process, that is the sense of the symbol, occurs twice because both events are ‘two simultaneous faces of one and the same surface, whose inside and outside, their “insistence” and “extra-being”, past and future, are in an always reversible continuity’ (LS, 34). In other words, meaning occurs both when an object of sense is seen as being formed from other symbols and as constituting the formation of other symbols. In semiotic terms, sense occurs as the synthesis of two different series: one as signifier and one as signified. At the point of this synthesis, a singularity of sense is created in both series: as an empty place within the series of signifier and a supernumerary object within the signified series. The relation of these series at their convergence forms the dual meaning of an object as a paradox between sense and nonsense. Nonsense should not be understood as the absence of sense but as that which produces sense; likewise sense produces nonsense as the two form a paradox of meaning throughout both series of signification. Meaning is the excess of these productions such that it occurs in both directions, simultaneously. In other words, the meaning of an object is only understood when it is placed within the context of its own text. A short example here would be one’s understanding of a sentence. A particular sentence has no meaning until every word and expression within that sentence is understood within the context of the language (i.e. within the context of its general usage) and within the context of the sentence (i.e. as the particular usage). While a phrase may have a metaphorical meaning (e.g. ‘kick the bucket’), that particular usage can only be understood within the context of a particular sentence as it also has a non-metaphorical meaning; this cannot be realised until the phrase’s context is realised. At that moment of realisation, the event of meaning finally occurs. In summary, meaning as the ultimate regression is what Deleuze terms the ‘excess’ of signification; it is the redundancy that arises when a signifier is realised to signify its own self (A Thousand Plateaus, 114). To clarify this one more time: a symbol’s meaning is understood only when the entirety of the semiotic relations that develop out of and into that symbol are understood—the symbol as a singularity.

Returning to Tillich, now, we can cast new light on Tillich’s usage of symbols. Symbols point beyond themselves like signs, however they must also ‘participate in the reality of that for which they stand’ (ST1, 265). This participation, in Deleuzian terms, is the duality of cause and effect which must coexist for the event of sense to occur. A symbol that does not participate in such a reality lacks the cause that gives it meaning; a symbol is meaningless without a creative relationship with its reference. A cross has no meaning in Buddhism itself because it, as a symbol, does not participate in the Buddhist reality. It is the duality of cause and effect which provides a reciprocal relation for a symbol and its reference in that the reference itself (e.g. the death and resurrection of Christ) becomes an occupant without a place within the signification of the symbol (e.g. the cross) and the symbol becomes an empty place within the signification of the reference. It is in this reciprocity that symbol and reference participate in one another; and this is the singularity that produces meaning. Tied with this is something implied in Tillich which Deleuze makes explicit: symbols always produce meaning, regardless of what that meaning is: ‘Your wife looked at you with a funny expression. And this morning the mailman handed you a letter from the IRS and crossed his fingers….It doesn’t matter what it means, it’s still signifying’ (ATP, 112). This is the reason why Tillich argues that symbols are irreplaceable; they are always producing meaning such that replacing them changes everything.

For Tillich, symbols hint at a paradox of participation. Taken through Deleuze’s’s concept of paradox of the production of sense and nonsense, we can anticipate Tillich’s understanding of paradox as a ‘concrete event which on the level of rationality must be expressed in contradictory terms’ (ST1, 149). With God participating in humanity and humanity participating in God through the christological symbols, these symbols produce the same excess as the series of signification do. The christological symbols can only be understood in both directions simultaneously: without one, we have a Jesus without Christ; without the other, a Christ without Jesus. It is also here that Tillich’s christological paradox becomes clear: God does not exist (ST1, 227). Tillich does this by de-ontologizing God; God cannot exist because God is not a being that can exist. The ontology of God becomes in Deleuzian terms, the empty space in the series of signification; God becomes the supernumerary object in the second series such that God can never be found along the Möbius strip of theology. God is always immanent but never present. Perhaps this gives new meaning to Christ’s proclamation that the Kingdom of God is at hand; for Christ himself is the Kingdom of God, immanent and transcendent. Yet it is always both simultaneously. These two terms–immanence and transcendence–should not be confused with a concept of presence (which is, sadly, another post another day).

Which way? Which way?

Published on 11 May 2009 ago in Philosophy. Closed Tags: , , , , , , , , , .
This is part 4 of 4 in the Logic of Sense series

Deleuze immediately makes clear the infinite regress of sense. Carroll’s work is insightful because it makes us confront “a synthesis of the heterogeneous; the serial form is necessarily realized in the simultaneity of at least two series” (36). the infinite regress of sense is itself a series, a series of multiple series that each inhere on each other–a synthesis of series. The two series operate different: one as signifier and the other as signified. The direct result of these two inhering on each other is a disequilibrium created by the excess of one in the other. The signifier series manifests as an occupant without a place, a supernumerary object in the signified series. This signified creates an empty place within the signifier. The excess of each series manifests as both esoteric and exoteric words in paradoxical forms in which each exists “only through the relations they maintain with one another” (50).

magnetThese relations, then, create singularities–that is, points of turning, inflections, tears, fusion, etc. Each of these “correspond to each one of the series of a structure” and is “the source of a series extending in a determined direction right up to the vicinity of another singularity” (52-3). Visually, these singularities create sets of divergent and convergent lines like that of a magnet.  Singularities form ideal events. With regards to time, events in their purest forms are never actualities. They are only tales and stories, events which are about to happen and those which have just happened. They are never in the present, never happening.

The disequilibrium of sense, which Deleuze points to through the various dualities (e.g. empty square and supernumerary object), is always in relation to itself as the paradox of nonsense (66). Nonsense, however, is not the lack of sense. The relation between sense and nonsense is not simply a copy of that between true and false. Instead, there is an original relation between the two. Sense is always produced, an effect of the relation between the signifier and signified. The paradox of sense is that nonsense is also present within sense and within the event of signification. Nonsense must be understood as being opposed to the abscense of sense because it produces sense in excess.

Sense should not be confused with “good sense.” “Good sense” always come second to sense as it presupposes a distrubution of sense. It, like the arrow of time, determines the direction which sense runs. The paradox of sense, though, is that it goes both directions simultaneously. Common sense identifies the objects within a language. Yet in Alice, identity is completely lost. The paradox is this reversal of both good sense and common sense. Alice discovers through the looking glass that common sense has long disappeared. Yet, at this very point where language itself seems impossible, “having no subject which expresses or manifests itself in it, no object to denote, no classes and no properties to signify according to a fixed order,” that the gift of meaning occurs before all good and common sense (79). With the passion of this paradox, language reaches the height of its power. The two directions of sense, of becoming-mad, are represented in by Carroll’s doubles. The pair of the Mad Hatter and the March Hare each live in one direction, the two inseparable from one another. Each direction segments itself to “the point that both are found in either” (79). The Hatter and Hare killed the present which survives only in the Dormouse. The present subsists only as the abstract moment, infinitely subdivisible into past and future. The maifestation of sense is always a fragile one within and without the abstract moment of the present.

Serialization of Signification

Published on 6 May 2009 ago in Philosophy. 3 Comments Tags: , , , , , , .
This is part 3 of 4 in the Logic of Sense series

Following the previous post on signification, the 4th series in Logic of Sense turns to dualities.  Speaking occurs as a movement along the surface (of the Möbius strip of meaning) and has everything to do with eating and being eaten. When one speaks, the subject which one speaks erupts from one’s lips (i.e. when one says “horse”, a horse jumps out of one’s mouth). The same is also true of hearing in that we eat the words; that is, the duality of cause (speaking) and effect (meaning) must coexist within one another in order to make the event of sense.

The 5th series turns back to the name of sense. It is an infinite regress of signification and denotation, which we find in Alice’s encounter with the Knight:

“The name of the song is called ‘Haddock’s Eyes‘” — “Oh, that’s the name of the song, is it?” Alice said, trying to feel interested. — “No, you don’t understand,” the Knight said, looking a little vexed. “That’s what the name of the song is called. The name really is ‘The Aged Aged Man.’” — “Then I ought to have said ‘That’s what the song is called’?” Alice corrected herself. — “No, you oughtn’t: that’s quite another thing! The song is called ‘Ways and Means‘: but that’s only what it’s called, you know!” — “Well, what is the song then?” said Alice, who was by this time completely bewildered. — “I was coming to that,” the Knight said. “The song really is ‘A-sitting on a Gate‘!…” (29)

In Carroll’s writing, there are four classification of names: “there is [1] the name of what the song really is; the [2] name denoting this reality, which thus denotes the song or represents what the song is called; [3] the sense of this name, which forms a nre name or a new reality; and [4] the name which denotes this reality, which thus denotes the sense of the name of the song, or represents what the name of the song is called” (30). These four names are enough to provide a model of infinite regress of meaning as an alternation of a “real” name and a name which designates that reality. Sense is independent of this regress of signification. The event of sense always occurs twice in Alice because “they are two simultaneous faces of one and the same surface, whose inside and outside, their ‘insistence’ and ‘extra-being,’ past and future, are in an always reversible continuity” (34).

The word is flat

Published on 30 April 2009 ago in Philosophy. Closed Tags: , , , , , , , , .
This is part 2 of 4 in the Logic of Sense series

In the “Second Series of Paradoxes of Surface Effects” in Logic of Sense, Deleuze turns the play between causes and effects to the surface (so to speak). The two are transformed into bodies and events that manifest on the surface. In Alice in Wonderland, the animals (which are deep) are usurped as “nobility” by thickless card figures (p. 9). Deleuze suspects that Alice isn’t about the adventures of Alice (as the original title suggested) but about the single adventure of Alice: “her climb to the surface, her avowal of false depth, and her discovery that everything happens at the border” (9). It is on the surface where bodies produce events and have effects and Lewis Carroll saw this clearly.  In Sylvie and Bruno, the character “[learns] his lessons in all manners, inside-out, outside-in, above and below, but never ‘in depth’” (10).

Manifestation is part of the hermeneutical cycle for Deleuze.  Unlike Heidegger’s hermeneutical circle, Deleuze suggests it is a Möbius strip.  This strip highlights the logical paradox of signification that “‘Z is true if A, B, and C are true…,’ and so on to infinity” (16). The truth of a proposition is much like the Snark in Alice. It is by unfolding and untwisting the Möbius strip that the dimension of sense appears as it animates the (truth of) the proposition (20). The image of the Möbius strip represents the hermeneutical cycle not as a circle but as “the coexistence of two sides without thickness, such that we pass from one to the other by following their length” (22). Sense is not an effect or a result but the extra-Being which inheres or subsists; it is an “event” but “on the condition that the event is not confused with its spatio-temporal realization in a state of affairs” (22). Language itself is the flat world of the sense-event.

Down the rabbit hole

Published on 29 April 2009 ago in Philosophy. Closed Tags: , , , , , .
This is part 1 of 4 in the Logic of Sense series

It has been a few years since I read Deleuze’s Logic of Sense.  Since that first reading, I have wanted to read it closely, as I believe it is undervalued (or even unknown!) in hermeneutics. After much reading elsewhere, I feel comfortable enough to provide a close reading of Logic of Sense. I will not stop at every “chapter”, that is series (Deleuze has a mastery of breaking traditional authorship manners), but will instead concentrate on Deleuze’s framing of sense in hermeneutical terms, one of the larger points I believe he makes in the text. In the short preface, Deleuze provides some insight into what his focus is:

We present here a series of paradoxes which form the theory of sense. It is easy to explain why this theory is inseparable from paradoxes: sense is a nonexisting entity, and, in fact, maintains very special relations with nonsense. (Logic of Sense, xiii)

This resonates very well with Nietzsche’s concept of truth as “an army of metaphors:

What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms — in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins. (from The Portable Nietzsche, 46-7).

Deleuze’s tactic, however, differs from Nietzsche’s.  While Nietzsche focused on genealogical analyses, Deleuze is instead insterested in seeing it relationally where “certain points of one figure in a series refer to the points of another figure” (xiv) but without depth. Deleuze’s concept of sense aims to be one of purely surface structures without any kind of hidden meaning or depth underneath it all.